Ortiz v Rental Management Inc by unknown
1995 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-12-1995 
Ortiz v Rental Management Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995 
Recommended Citation 
"Ortiz v Rental Management Inc" (1995). 1995 Decisions. 252. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/252 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1995 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
               
 
Nos. 95-3027, 95-3045 
               
 
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY,  
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY, 
THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY, 
OHIO EDISON COMPANY, and 
PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY, 
 
       Appellants 
 
v. 
 
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION 
               
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 91-720) 
               
 
Argued August 25, 1995 
 
BEFORE:  GREENBERG, COWEN and SAROKIN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 12, 1995) 
               
 
     John H. O'Neill, Jr. (argued) 
     James B. Hamlin 
     Linda S. Wendtland 
     David C. Goldberg 
     Shaw, Pittman, Potts & 
      Trowbridge 
     2300 N Street, N.W. 
     Washington, D.C.  20037 
 
     John H. Bingler, Jr. 
     Deborah P. Powell 
     Thorp, Reed & Armstrong 
     One Riverfront Center 
     Pittsburgh, PA  15222 
 
     Edwyna G. Anderson 
     Larry R. Crayne 
     Duquesne Light Company 
2 
     One Oxford Centre 
     301 Grant Street 
     Pittsburgh, PA  15279 
 
      Attorneys for Appellants 
 
 
     James W. Quinn 
     Mindy J. Spector (argued) 
     Weil, Gotshal & Manges 
     767 Fifth Avenue 
     New York, NY  10153 
      
     Kevin W. Brode 
     Westinghouse Electric    
   Corporation 
     STC/701 Building 
     1310 Beulah Road 
     Pittsburgh, PA  15235 
 
      Attorneys for Appellee 
 
               
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
               
 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
3 
 The plaintiffs appeal from judgments entered against them on all counts of their 
complaint.  The district court granted the defendant summary judgment on certain of the 
plaintiffs' counts and dismissed others by granting defendant's motion made pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) at the close of plaintiffs' case.  On the one remaining claim, the 
jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant.  Because we find no merit in the myriad 
of issues the plaintiffs raise, we will affirm the judgment and orders of the district 
court. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 The plaintiffs -- Duquesne Light Company, The Cleveland Electric Illuminating 
Company, The Toledo Edison Company, Ohio Edison Company, and the Pennsylvania Power 
Company -- together constructed and own the Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station, a two
unit nuclear energy generating facility located near Pittsburgh Pennsylvania.  Duquesne 
points out that it had primary responsibility for supervising the construction of the 
plant, and it now "operates the plant on behalf of the co-owners."  Br. at 5 n.2.  We 
therefore will refer to the plaintiffs singularly as Duquesne. 
 In the 1960's, Duquesne issued a request for proposals and bid specifications 
for equipment to be used at the plant. Westinghouse submitted a proposal, and, after 
negotiations, entered into a contract with Duquesne under which it agreed to supply 
Nuclear Steam Supply Systems (NSSS) for the Beaver Valley units.  It is beyond doubt that 
during these negotiations the parties had sophisticated technical, commercial, and legal 
advice.  The parties executed the contracts for the units respectively on October 3, 1967, 
and January 5, 1972.  Each NSSS contains a nuclear reactor, three steam generators, and a 
number of other components that together convert heat from nuclear fission into steam.  
The steam generators for the first unit were installed in 1972; those for the second unit 
were installed in 1981.  The units began commercial operations in, respectively, April 
1977 and November 1987.  Duquesne contends that when it negotiated the contracts, it 
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sought steam generators that would last approximately 40 years and it points to facts that 
tend to support that contention.   For instance the method of installing the NSSS 
equipment makes removing or replacing the steam generators extremely difficult. 
 In the 1980s, Duquesne discovered corrosion and cracking in the generators' "U"
shaped Inconel-made tubes through which radioactive water is pumped from the reactor 
vessel to the steam generators.  Such corrosion and cracking affect both the plant's power 
output and safety.  Duquesne engaged experts to examine the rapid deterioration who 
concluded, among other things, that the tube material -- Inconel 600 -- made the equipment 
unusually susceptible to corrosion.  Duquesne ultimately determined that it would have to 
replace the steam generators. 
 On April 30, 1991, Duquesne filed this action against Westinghouse alleging 
breach of contract, breach of warranty, breach of the Uniform Commercial Code duty of good 
faith, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Racketeering Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) and (c).  On December 1, 1993, 
Westinghouse filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts of the complaint.  The 
district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge who issued a thorough and 
detailed report and recommendation on July 18, 1994. In an order dated August 29, 1994, 
the district court adopted (with modifications) the magistrate judge's report and 
recommendation, and granted Westinghouse summary judgment on Duquesne's negligent 
misrepresentation claim and on its claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b).  The court denied the 
motion in all other respects,0 and rejected Westinghouse's argument that the various 
statutes of limitations and repose precluded Duquesne's claims. 
 The case proceeded to trial on September 12, 1994.  At the close of Duquesne's 
case Westinghouse moved for judgment as a matter of law, and on October 24 the district 
                     
0The court divided Duquesne's section 1962(c) claim into two parts, and granted summary 
judgment on one of them.  Thus, the court granted Westinghouse's motion insofar as the 
claim was based on the "Nuclear Supplier Enterprise" but denied it insofar as it was based 
on the "Beaver Valley Project Enterprise." 
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court in a bench opinion granted that motion in most respects.  It dismissed Duquesne's 
claims of breach of contract, breach of warranty, breach of the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing, and violations of RICO.  It also dismissed Duquesne's claim for punitive 
damages.  The court permitted Duquesne's fraud claim, however, to go to the jury.  On 
December 6, 1994, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Westinghouse on that claim.  The 
court entered judgment on December 7, and Duquesne timely filed a notice of appeal.
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because of the RICO claim, the district 
court exercised subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) and 28 U.S.C. §1331, 
and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The Verdict  
1. The Trial Time Limitations 
 We begin with Duquesne's attack on the jury verdict, since the jury's findings 
impact on our analysis of the other claims.  Duquesne's primary argument challenging the 
verdict involves the district court's allocation of trial time.  During a pretrial 
conference, the parties and the court agreed to limit each side's time to 140 hours, to 
include the sum of that party's case, its cross-examination of the opposing party's 
witnesses, and its opening and closing arguments.  App. 87.  But on the 12th day of trial 
the court, frustrated with what it perceived as duplication of evidence, and concerned 
that the complicated technical testimony was confusing the jury, concluded that "all the 
business I have given you about 141 hours is off now."  App. 823.0  The court ruled that 
each side would receive 22 days to present its case.  And since Duquesne already had used 
                     
0Westinghouse has filed a notice of appeal from the district court's denial of most of its 
motion for summary judgment.  We are dismissing the appeal and striking the additional 
brief Westinghouse filed in support of that appeal.   
0The parties as well as the district court all agreed that Pennsylvania law governs the 
state law claims.  Accordingly, we apply Pennsylvania law. 
0According to the transcript the court did say 141 rather than 140 hours. 
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up 11 days, the court allowed it only an additional 11.  App. 827-28. Furthermore, a "day" 
did not necessarily entail an entire day. Rather, as long as some testimony was heard on a 
given day, it counted as a full day.  Duquesne argues that because it had budgeted its 
trial time during the first 11 days based on the 140 hour schedule, "[t]he district 
court's unilateral change in the basic trial rules caused irreparable prejudice" to its 
case.  Br. at 34.  We review a district court's decisions in its management of a trial for 
abuse of discretion.  See Reed v. Philadelphia, Bethlehem & New England R.R. Co., 939 F.2d 
128, 133 (3d Cir. 1991) ("In matters of trial procedure such as that involved here, the 
trial judge is entrusted with wide discretion because he [or she] is in a far better 
position than we to appraise the effect" of a particular procedure on the parties.).
 Although the procedural rules governing federal civil litigation do not 
explicitly authorize a district court to set time limits for a trial, a district court has 
inherent power "to control cases before it," provided it exercises the power "'in a manner 
that is in harmony with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'"  G. Heileman Brewing Co. 
v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (quoting Landau & Cleary, 
Ltd. v. Hribar Trucking, Inc., 867 F.2d 996, 1002 (7th Cir. 1989)).  The rules repeatedly 
embody the principle that trials should be both fair and efficient.  Thus, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.  Similarly, the Federal 
Rules of Evidence "shall be construed to secure . . . elimination of unjustifiable expense 
and delay."  Fed. R. Evid. 102.  More particularly, Fed. R. Evid. 403 allows judges to 
exclude even relevant evidence because of "considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."    
 Numerous courts have inferred from these provisions a court's authority to set 
time limits.  See, e.g., MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 
1081, 1171 (7th Cir.) (setting a period of time for the trial is "not, per se, an abuse of 
discretion"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891, 104 S.Ct. 234 (1983); Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. 
7 
Supp. 1204, 1235 & n.42 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (allowing each side a total block of hours for 
direct and cross examination), rev'd in part on other grounds, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 959, 111 S.Ct. 1580 (1991);  United States v. Reaves, 636 F. 
Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Ky. 1986);  SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 77 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Conn. 
1977).  We similarly believe that courts have discretion to impose limits on a party's 
trial presentation without the necessity of ruling specifically on "each particular item 
of evidence offered."  SCM Corp., Id. at 13.  After all, "'it has never been supposed that 
a party has an absolute right to force upon an unwilling tribunal an unending and 
superfluous mass of testimony limited only by [its] own judgment and whim.'" MCI 
Communications, 708 F.2d at 1171 (quoting 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1907 (Chadbourne Rev. 
1976)).  Indeed, some district judges have found that the imposition of time limits 
increases the efficiency of the trial from everybody's perspective.  As one court has 
explained: 
'It requires counsel to exercise a discipline of economy choosing 
between what is important and what is less so.  It reduces the 
incidence of the judge interfering in strategic decisions.  It gives a 
cleaner, crisper, better-tried case.  It gives a much lower cost to 
the clients.  Finally, it will save months of our lives.' 
 
United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. at 1580 (quoting Leval, From the Bench, Litigation
at 8 (1985)). 
 However, because by their very nature such procedures can result in courts 
dispensing with the general practice to evaluate each piece of offered evidence 
individually, district courts should not exercise this discretion as a matter of course. 
As one court has put it, witnesses should not be excluded "on the basis of mere numbers."  
MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1171. Rather, a district court should impose time limits 
only when necessary, after making an informed analysis based on a review of the parties' 
proposed witness lists and proffered testimony, as well as their estimates of trial time.  
And, the court must ensure that it allocates trial time evenhandedly.  But still th
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courts need not allow parties excessive time so as to turn a trial into a circus.  After 
all, a court's resources are finite and a court must dispose of much litigation.  In 
short, the litigants in a particular case do not own the court. 
 The district court's action in this case differs from that taken in the cases we 
cite above because here the court granted each party a specific allotment of time, but 
halfway through Duquesne's case rescinded some of the grant.  As a general matter, "it is 
the task of counsel, not the Court, to make the selection of materials most appropriate 
for introduction into evidence."  SCM Corp., 77 F.R.D. at 12-13.  Thus, while courts 
certainly should have flexibility in reassessing imposed time limits, they ordinarily 
should allow a party to fill its allotment with whatever evidence that party deems 
appropriate, subject, of course, to rules of admissibility independent of the overall time 
limitation for the case being tried.  As a corollary, an allocation of trial time relied 
upon by the parties should not be taken away easily and without warning.   
 SCM Corp. provides a good illustration of when mid-trial imposition of time 
limits is appropriate.  There, the court "repeatedly brought to the attention of 
plaintiff's counsel a concern that the pace of the trial seemed unlikely to comport with 
the original estimates."  77 F.R.D. at 13.  The court sought witness lists, requested 
plaintiff's counsel to re-estimate the time he needed, "cautioned counsel that some more 
rigorous action would have to be taken to keep the trial within manageable limits and 
urged a reconsideration of the amount of material to be introduced and the presentation of 
a less ambitious schedule." Id. at 13.  When the court's numerous efforts proved 
unavailing, it sua sponte imposed constraints upon the parties' trial time. But even then 
the court allotted plaintiff "50% more than the top range of counsel's [original] 
estimate."  Id. at 15.  In other words, while the court issued a time constraint order 
mid-trial, it still allowed the parties the only allocation of time upon which they 
reasonably could have relied. 
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 Here, however, the district court neither requested nor reviewed any proffered 
materials prior to issuing its mid-trial order.  While Westinghouse contends that the 
court repeatedly warned Duquesne of its cumulative presentation, it refers us only to a 
series of isolated instances over 11 days of testimony in which the court sustained 
objections because testimony was repetitive or because a question was asked and answered.  
See, e.g., app. 401 ("We have been through that before and we are not going to go through 
it again."); app. 649-50 ("We have been over this a number of times."); app. 666 ("We have 
been over this with another witness.  We are not going to repeat it again."); app. 705
(sustaining "asked and answered" objection); app. 727 ("We have been over this."); app. 
762 ("You have already asked him that."); app. 782 (sustaining "asked and answered" 
objection); id. at 794 (same).  Thus, unlike in SCM Corp., the court here gave Duquesne 
little indication of the consequences of its trial behavior.   
 Further still, the method by which the district court calculated a party's time 
is puzzling.  Westinghouse's cross-examination of Duquesne's witnesses counted against 
Duquesne's time, and vice versa.  Therefore, Duquesne contends that the court's order, 
rather than promoting efficiency at trial, made it difficult for the parties to "control 
the clock and accurately budget their time."  Br. at 34 n.28.  Finally, Duquesne almost 
certainly planned its trial strategy based on the initial 140 hour allotment, and when the 
court took its action well into its case, Duquesne had little opportunity to reassess its 
plans. Westinghouse, on the other hand, had a full 11 days, i.e., the balance of time 
remaining after the court modified the time allocation on Duquesne's case, to reassess its 
initial budget and modify its trial strategy accordingly. 
 Nevertheless despite our concern about the district court's action, we will
reverse because we are unable to conclude that its ruling had any impact on the outcome of 
the case.  In the first place, Duquesne in its brief speaks of prejudice in vague and 
general terms, and therefore fails to delineate how the district court's decision 
adversely affected its case.  Moreover, our independent review of Duquesne's motion for 
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reconsideration of the altered trial schedule filed the day after the court's scheduling 
ruling as well as the offer of proof Duquesne made at the close of its case leave us 
unconvinced that its proposed testimony would have added much to what it introduced during 
its allotted time.  Finally, the fact that Duquesne seems to use the district court's 
order to attack only the jury verdict but not the claims upon which the court granted 
Westinghouse judgment as a matter of law, makes us wary of accepting Duquesne's argument.
Therefore, we do not believe the district court's action constitutes reversible error, and 
we decline to reverse on this ground. 
2. The Jury Instructions 
 Next, Duquesne challenges the district court's jury instructions.  We recently 
explained that: 
Generally, '[t]he standard of review for the district court's ruling 
on points for charge is . . . abuse of discretion.'  Link v. Mercedes-
Benz of North America, Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir. 1986).  Where, 
as here, a party contends that the charge as given states an incorrect 
legal standard, 'we will review the charge as a whole in the light of 
the evidence to determine if it fairly and adequately submitted the 
issues to the jury and we will reverse if the instructions were 
capable of confusing and thereby misleading the jury.'  Griffiths v. 
CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 462 (3d Cir.) (citing Limbach Co. v. Sheet 
Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 949 F.2d 1241, 1259 n.15 (3d Cir. 1991) (in 
banc)), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 186 (1993). 
 
Fashauer v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 57 F.3d 1269, 1273 (3d Cir. 1995).  
 First, Duquesne contends that the district court erred in denying its request to 
charge the jury that nondisclosures can constitute fraud.  In this ruling, the court 
relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551 which it determined constitutes Pennsylvania 
law on the issue.  Section 551 of the Restatement provides that liability may be imposed 
on a party to a business transaction only when it has a duty to speak.  That duty, 
according to the Restatement, exists only in limited circumstances, including (1) when 
                     
0The one exception is Duquesne's conclusory statement that it "could have presented even 
more evidence [supporting its RICO claim] if [its] trial time had not been arbitrarily and 
unfairly cut in half by the district court."  Br. at 46 n.33. 
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there is a fiduciary, or confidential, relationship between the parties; (2) when 
disclosure is necessary to prevent an ambiguous or partial statement from being 
misleading; (3) where subsequently acquired knowledge makes a previous representation 
false; (4) where the undisclosed fact is basic to the transaction.  Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 551(2). 
 The threshold inquiry on this point is whether Pennsylvania has adopted section 
551.  In Neuman v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank & Trust Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
held that "[t]he deliberate nondisclosure of a material fact amounts to culpable 
misrepresentation no less than does an intentional affirmation of a material falsity."  51 
A.2d 759, 764 (Pa. 1947). Although the court did not delineate the elements of the tort, 
it specifically cited to Restatement section 551.  Id.  Numerous intermediate appellate 
courts in Pennsylvania have followed Neuman's lead and held, following the principles in 
the Restatement, that to be liable for material nondisclosures, a party must have a duty 
to speak.  In the oft-cited Smith v. Renaut, 564 A.2d 188 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court began its analysis by noting that "'fraud consists in anything 
calculated to deceive, whether . . . it be . . . by speech or silence. . . . It is any 
artifice by which a person is deceived to his disadvantage.'"  Id. at 192 (quoting 
McClellan Estate, 75 A.2d 595 (Pa. 1950)).  But, the court continued, "[w]hile a 
concealment may constitute fraud, mere silence is not sufficient in the absence of a duty 
to speak."  Id.  In that case, the court held that "a seller has an affirmative duty to 
disclose a known termite infestation."  Id. at 192 (citing Quashnock v. Frost, 445 A.2d 
121, 124 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (in banc)).  Similarly, in Wilson v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co.
598 A.2d 1310, 1315-16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), the court held that "[c]oncealment can be a 
sufficient basis for finding that a party engaged in fraudulent conduct, . . . however, 
mere silence is not sufficient in the absence of a duty to speak."  See also Quashnock v. 
Frost, 445 A.2d at 130 (Spaeth, J., concurring) (relying on section 551).  In Estate of 
Evasew v. Evasew, 584 A.2d 910 (Pa. 1990), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explicitly 
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approved the duty to speak prerequisite, holding that "an omission is actionable as fraud 
only where there is an independent duty to disclose the omitted information."  Id. at 913 
(relying on City of Harrisburg v. Bradford Trust Co., 621 F. Supp. 463 (M.D. Pa. 1985)).
 But while Pennsylvania courts have adopted the duty to speak requirement, the
cases leave us uncertain of the extent to which Pennsylvania law includes the 
Restatement's discrete criteria for when a duty to speak arises.  Furthermore, the 
district court incompletely analyzed the elements of section 551 -- looking only at 
whether there was a confidential relationship between the parties.  Nevertheless, we 
conclude that Pennsylvania courts would not impose liability in the circumstances of this 
case.  Pennsylvania courts analyzing whether there was a duty to speak rely almost 
exclusively on the nature of the contract between the parties and the scope of one party's 
reliance on the other's representations.  Thus, in the termite infestation cases, see
Quashnock v. Frost, 445 A.2d 121, and Smith v. Renaut, 564 A.2d 188, the buyer is at th
whim of the seller to disclose such latent problems, which discoverable by other 
reasonable means. In those circumstances, it cannot be said fairly that by failing to 
disclose the seller is legitimately enhancing his or her bargain.  Similarly, in Neuman
the plaintiff "justifiably" relied on a bank's representation that another party had 
offered a specific amount for the stock itself, see Neuman, 51 A.2d at 764; in that case, 
the bank was the only reasonable source of the information.  Id. at 765.  And in Scaife 
Co. v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 285 A.2d 451 (Pa. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 920, 92 
S.Ct. 2459 (1972), the court analyzed the duty to speak under reliance principles, and 
                     
0Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 889 n.12 (Pa. 1994), did not change things.  In that case, 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that "[t]he tort of intentional non-disclosure has 
the same elements as the tort of intentional misrepresentation except that in a case of 
intentional non-disclosure the party intentionally conceals a material fact rather than 
making an affirmative misrepresentation."  While the Court did not expressly point out the 
duty to speak requirement, in reaching its conclusions it relied on Neuman v. Corn 
Exchange Nat'l Bank & Trust, Wilson v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., and Smith v. Renaut.  Those 
cases, which go into more detail on the subject, all imply a duty to speak requirement.
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held that "the jury could have concluded that [the defendant] knowingly abused 
[plaintiff's] confidence." Id. at 456.   
 None of these cases is applicable to the situation present here, where the two 
parties are sophisticated business entities, with equal and ample access to legal 
representation. "[S]uperior information and better business acumen are legitimate 
advantages, which lead to no liability."  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551 comment k.  
As Westinghouse correctly points out, there is virtually no Pennsylvania case in which a 
defendant has been held to have a duty to speak when both the plaintiff and defendant were 
sophisticated business entities, entrusted with equal knowledge of the facts.  We also 
note that while the court did not explicitly charge the jury to consider omissions, it 
permitted Duquesne's counsel to argue "that the misrepresentation consists of both a false 
statement and a partially correct statement that requires other information in order to be 
correct."  App. 1930.  This ruling was tantamount to allowing Duquesne to present its 
fraudulent omission claim to the jury. 
 Duquesne also contends that the district court's jury instructions did not 
permit the jury to consider Westinghouse's post-contract fraud.  Duquesne relies on the 
district court's statement at the beginning of its charge that "[p]laintiffs allege that 
the defendant fraudulently induced them to enter into certain contracts by making false 
representations."  App. 1978. However, the district court, in delineating the elements of 
a fraud claim, did not limit the claim temporally.  Moreover, Westinghouse points out that 
the verdict form paralleled the substantive fraud instruction rather than the court's 
initial comments.  Further still, the judge's preliminary instructions did include in its 
characterization of Duquesne's contention that Westinghouse "continued to defraud 
[Duquesne] by making additional misrepresentations . . . ."  App. 126.  Finally, Duquesne 
in its closing arguments referred repeatedly to Westinghouse's post-fraud actions.  
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Although the instructions were not absolutely clear we do not believe that the charge as a 
whole presents an incorrect view of the law.0 
 Finally, Duquesne argues that the jury verdict must be overturned because the 
district court made numerous evidentiary errors.  In particular, it contends that the 
court erred in excluding two exhibits, an expert's testimony and certain rebuttal 
evidence.  We have reviewed these claims and find no error of law or abuse of discretion 
in these rulings.  We therefore will affirm the judgment entered on the jury verdict.
 
B. The Judgment As a Matter of Law 
 Duquesne next challenges the district court's grant of Westinghouse's motion for 
judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).  We exercise plenary review 
over the district court's grant of a Rule 50(a) motion, see McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 
446, 454 (3d Cir. 1995).  A district court should grant such a motion only if, viewing all 
the evidence in favor of the nommoving party, no reasonable jury could find liability on a 
particular point.  Id. (citing Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d 
Cir. 1993)). 
1. Failure to Deliver Conforming Goods 
 Duquesne contends that the district court erred by refusing to send its contract 
claim of "failure to deliver conforming goods" to the jury.  The district court granted 
Westinghouse's motion for judgment as a matter of law on this count, concluding that 
"[t]he contract is unambiguous in providing that the design life of the steam generators 
was not a guarantee."  We agree. 
 Of course, the goal of contract interpretation is to discover the parties' 
objective mutual intent.  Under Pennsylvania law "'[i]t is firmly settled that the intent 
                     
0Duquesne cites to portions of Westinghouse's closing statement as prejudicing its post
contract allegations, but it does not appear that Duquesne preserved its objections to the 
closing argument. 
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of the parties to a written contract is contained in the writing itself.'"  Samuel 
Rappaport Family Partnership v. Meridian Bank, 657 A.2d 17, 21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) 
(quoting Krizovensky v. Krizovensky, 624 A.2d 638, 642-43 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)); see also
Hullett v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 38 F.3d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1994) 
("Pennsylvania courts apply the 'plain meaning rule' of interpretation of contracts which 
assumes that the intent of the parties to an instrument is 'embodied in the writing itself 
. . . .'") (citation omitted).  Thus, where, as here, the parties have reduced their 
agreement to writing, Pennsylvania courts presume that the parties' mutual intent can be 
ascertained by examining the writing.  Only where the writing is ambiguous may the 
factfinder examine all the relevant extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' mutual 
intent. Allegheny Int'l, Inc. v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 40 F.3d 1416, 1424 (3d Cir. 
1994).  Therefore, as a preliminary matter, courts must "'determin[e] as a matter of law 
which category written contract terms fall into -- clear or ambiguous.'"  Id. (citation 
omitted).  There are, as we recently noted, two kinds of ambiguity, patent ambiguity and 
latent ambiguity: 
'[a] patent ambiguity is that which appears on the face of the 
instrument, and arises from the defective, obscure, or insensible 
language used.'  Black's Law Dictionary 105 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).  In 
contrast, a latent ambiguity arises from extraneous or collateral 
facts which make the meaning of a written agreement uncertain although 
the language thereof, on its face, appears clear and unambiguous.  
Easton v. Washington County Ins. Co., 137 A.2d 332 (1957).' 
 
Allegheny, 40 F.3d at 1424 (quoting Steuart v. McChesney, 444 A.2d 659, 663 (Pa. 1982)).
 Because of Pennsylvania's presumption that the writing conveys the parties' 
intent,  
'[a] contract will be found ambiguous "if, and only if, it is 
reasonably or fairly susceptible of different constructions and is 
capable of being understood in more senses than one and is obscure in 
meaning through indefiniteness of expression or has a double meaning.  
A contract is not ambiguous if the court can determine its meaning 
without any guide other than a knowledge of the simple facts on which, 
from the nature of the language in general, its meaning depends; and a 
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contract is not rendered ambiguous by the mere fact that the parties 
do not agree on the proper construction."' 
 
Meridian Bank, 657 A.2d at 21-22 (quoting Krizovensky, 625 A.2d at 642-43). 
 Pennsylvania law permits courts to examine certain forms of extrinsic evidence 
in determining whether a contract is ambiguous.  But lest the ambiguity inquiry degenerate 
into an impermissible analysis of the parties' subjective intent, such an inquiry 
appropriately is confined to determining "the parties' linguistic reference."  Mellon 
Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 n.12 (3d Cir. 1980).  In 
other words, "extrinsic evidence may be utilized to demonstrate the existence of a latent 
ambiguity."  Meridian Bank, 657 A.2d at 22 (citing Lohmann v. Piczon, 487 A.2d 1386 (Pa. 
1985)).  Thus, as we pointed out in Mellon Bank, when the contract refers to $10,000, 
unless we looked at extrinsic evidence we might never learn that the parties were 
referring to Canadian rather than American dollars.  619 F.2d at 1011 n.12.  In making the 
ambiguity determination, then, we "'consider the words of the contract, the alternative 
meaning suggested by counsel, and the nature of the objective evidence to be offered in 
support of that meaning.'"  Hullett, 38 F.3d at 111 (citation omitted). 
 The essence of Duquesne's contract claim is that Westinghouse agreed to provide 
steam generators that would last for 40 years.  Unable to point to any provision in the 
contract that clearly supports this proposition, Duquesne predicates this claim largely on 
the following provision of the contract's technical specifications: 
Consideration shall be taken of all NSSS components subject to the 
loss of ductility arising from integrated neutron exposure (nvt) based 
on a minimum station life of 42 yr operating at an 85 per cent load 
factor. The reactor internals shall be so designed that they may be 
completely removed by remote handling techniques without the use of 
divers. 
 
App. 2228.0  Duquesne's reading would stretch this language to unimaginable proportions, 
as it would turn the 42 year station life by which certain components were to be judged 
                     
0Except for this provision, Duquesne cites contract clauses that do not even relate to the 
life of the components. 
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into an express contractual guarantee that the steam generators themselves would last for 
40 years.  Contrary to Duquesne's interpretation, this provision clearly and by its very 
terms covers only components subject to the loss of ductility arising from neutron 
exposure.  Duquesne points to no evidence in the record that steam generators were subject 
to such loss of ductility.  The evidence in fact shows the contrary.  App. 488-89 
(Campbell testimony) (steam generators are not "subject to the loss of ductility arising 
from integrated neutron exposure").0 
 Moreover, we find support in this interpretation from the format, construction 
and terms of the contract generally. First, the provision on which Duquesne relies is 
contained not in the contract proper but in its third exhibit which details "technical 
specification for nuclear equipment and nuclear steam supply system."  There is an article 
in the contract proper entitled "Warranties," see App. 2159, which one would expect would 
include any such guarantee, if there was one, in explicit terms.  Second, as we discuss 
                     
0When pressed further, Duquesne's witness' testimony confirms the lack of merit in 
Duquesne's contract language-based argument: 
 
A: . . . I don't believe that this paragraph was intended in any way 
to suggest that only those components subject to high neutron 
radiation would be designed for 42 years, but this paragraph was 
intended to ask for particular attention to be paid those components. 
 
Q: Well, can you show me any provision in the bid specification, 
because I haven't been able to find it, that states the steam 
generators shall last for 40 years?  Can you find that language any 
place in the bid specification, Mr. Campbell? 
 
A: I don't know that I can, but it was generally understood by all 
concerned that the plant was expected to last for more than one year.  
It wasn't expected to last for all eternity, but it was expected to 
last for some reasonable number of years, and that reasonable number 
of years, it was understood, was about 40 years. 
 
App. 489.  Of course, the parties' expectations, standing alone, are irrelevant without 
any contractual hook on which to pin them. For example, if the contract provided that the 
steam generators would "last for a significant period of time," the analysis would perhaps 
be different.  In such a case, not only would a factfinder need to define "reasonable," 
but the duty of good faith, discussed infra, might affect a determination of the parties' 
reasonable expectations. 
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below, the "Warranties" section provides in no uncertain terms that "[t]he warranties and 
remedies set forth herein are exclusive and are in lieu of all other warranties and 
remedies whether statutory, express or implied."  Contract Art. IV(C) at app. 2162.  That 
section provides that the equipment "shall be suitable for operation as part of the NSSS 
sold hereunder" but that "[t]he equipment warranty shall expire one year after successful 
completion of the Performance Test, but not later than three years after SHIPMENT, 
whichever occurs first."  Art. IV(B) at app. 2160.  A plain reading of this section 
precludes Duquesne's contractual argument.0 
 Duquesne does not dispute that this warranty provision is a binding part of the 
contract.  Rather, it contends that the warranty clause contradicts the specification 
provision on which it relies, and therefore, "'[g]iven a head-on conflict between an 
express warranty and a disclaimer, the disclaimer is the one that suffers.'"  Reply Br. at 
5 (quoting 1 Quinn's Uniform Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest § 2-313[A][11], at 
2-219 (2d ed. 1991)).  Whatever the merits of Duquesne's legal reasoning, here there is 
head-on collision.  To the contrary, the warranty provision simply confirms our 
straightforward reading of the specifications.  After all, "[t]he strongest external sign 
of agreement between contracting parties is the words they use in their written con
Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1009. 
 Duquesne's argument would be more plausible if it cited evidence of custom in 
the industry in agreeing to contract terms, or the parties' prior practice.  But the 
evidence on which it relies is not probative of ambiguity.  First, it cites the technical 
bid specifications Duquesne issued to which Westinghouse apparently did not object.  Br. 
at 20-21.  Of course, the specific language in the contract trumps these specifications, 
                     
0Based on Duquesne's counsel's comments at oral argument, we expect Duquesne to protest 
that we are confusing its contractual argument with its warranty claim.  If so we stand 
accused.  In point of fact, we do believe that Duquesne's contract-based argument is 
simply a back-door means of expanding the warranty period beyond what the parties 
bargained for. 
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but at any rate the documents are not inconsistent.  Second, Duquesne relies on testimony 
that the parties, including Westinghouse, expected the steam generators to last for 42 
years and that no provision was made to remove the steam generators if they became 
defective prior to that.  Br. at 21-22.  See, e.g., app. 899 (testimony of Westinghouse 
official Stern) ("I didn't think it was necessary to provide an opening in the vapor 
containment for the removal of the steam generator."); app. 423 (testimony of Duquesne 
representative recalling conversation with Stern); app. 317 (testimony of Superintendent 
of Construction at facility) ("There were no provisions made for the steam generators to 
be removed.");  app. 371 (testimony of Duquesne representative regarding negotiations with 
Westinghouse) ("[M]y understanding was that in all the discussions we had with 
Westinghouse that the 42 years was the basis for the design of the plant.").  Of course, 
the parties' expectations or hope that the steam generators would last for 42 years cannot 
form the basis for reading a provision into the contract.  Duquesne cites no testimony 
that the drafters of the contract interpreted the provision it relies on to guarantee that 
the steam generators would function for 42 years.  The closest Duquesne comes is the 
testimony of Campbell, quoted earlier (see supra, n.8), who conceded that he could not 
find a provision in the bid specifications ensuring that the steam generators would last 
for 40 years. 
 As such, we will not rewrite the contract.  We therefore affirm the distri
court's ruling granting Westinghouse judgment on this count of the complaint. 
2. Breach of Warranty 
 Next, Duquesne challenges the district court's dismissal of its breach of 
warranty claim.  The contracts each provide that: 
Westinghouse warrants that the equipment furnished hereunder by 
Westinghouse shall be free from defects in workmanship and material 
and shall be suitable for operation as part of the NSSS sold 
hereunder. 
 
*  *  *   
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The equipment warranty shall expire one year after successful 
completion of the Performance Test, but not later than three years 
after SHIPMENT, whichever occurs first. If, during said period, the 
Owner promptly notifies Westinghouse and establishes that the 
equipment warranty is not met, Westinghouse shall perform such repair 
replacement or modification as required to meet this equipment 
warranty. 
 
app. 2160-61; app. 2338-39. 
 The district court, pointing out that "[t]he parties agree that the warranty 
period under the Beaver Valley I contract expired on July 1st, 1976, and the warranty 
period under the Beaver Valley 2 contract expired on May 31st, 1987," dismissed the claim 
for a number of reasons.  First, it held that Duquesne's argument was "contrary to the 
unambiguous contractual language stating that the design life is not a guarantee."  The 
court also reasoned as an alternative argument that "the evidence at trial has established 
that the alleged defect did not appear until after the expiration of the respective 
warranty periods. Plaintiffs did not negotiate for nor did they obtain a lifetime warranty 
regarding the steam generators." 
 Westinghouse is clearly correct that the contract clauses required the defect to 
manifest itself within one year.0 Duquesne in substance argues that the contract protects 
it against defects existing at the time the generator was installed but not discovered 
until after the warranty period.  Br. at 24. But the general rule, from which we see no 
reason to deviate, is that "an express warranty does not cover repairs made after the 
applicable time . . . ha[s] elapsed."  Abraham v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 795 F.2d 238, 
250 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing cases) (applying federal common law).  Thus, "'latent defects' 
discovered after the term of the warranty are not actionable." Id. at 249-50.  For 
example, in Kodiak Elec. Ass'n v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 694 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1984), the 
defendant delivered a defective generator, but the defect manifested itself in an injury 
only after the expiration of the express warranty period.  The court ruled that beca
                     
0Duquesne purchased extensions of the warranties but it does not claim that the defects 
appeared within the extension periods.  
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"the defect did not make its presence known until the time of the generator failure, 
nearly a year after the warranty had expired," the plaintiff did not have a breach of 
warranty claim.  Id. at 157 (applying Alaska law).  That is precisely the case here.  
also Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 973 F.2d 988, 993 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[C]ase 
law almost uniformly holds that time-limited warranties do not protect buyers against 
hidden defects -- defects that may exist before, but typically are not discovered until 
after, the expiration of the warranty period."). 
 Duquesne tries to exempt itself from the general rule by pointing to differences 
in the warranty language between its contract and those covered by the cases we cited 
above.  We find no qualitative difference in the language, however.  To be sure, the 
clause in Canal Elec. Co. provided that evidence of the defect must "appear" within the 
warranty period.  Id. at 991. But in the first place, that fact was incidental to the 
court's analysis.  In that case, the plaintiff relied upon the word "appear" in arguing 
for an exception from the general rule.  More importantly, the warranty language here is 
not ambiguous.  It requires notice to Westinghouse of the defect within the warranty 
period.  Of course, notice cannot be given of an undiscovered defect.  Therefore, the 
district court's reading of the clause is the only fair reading.  We will affirm the 
court's dismissal of the breach of warranty count.0 
3. Duty to Act in Good Faith 
 Duquesne also argues that the district court improperly granted Westinghouse 
judgment on its claim that Westinghouse breached its contractual duty to act in good faith 
and to deal fairly.  The district court dismissed the count because "[p]laintiffs have not 
cited any specific provision of the contract which would support the alleged duty owed by 
Westinghouse."  While the parties disagree about the scope of the duty provided in the 
                     
0In so doing, we reject Duquesne's argument that Westinghouse is equitably estopped from 
relying on the time limits contained in the warranty clause. 
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Uniform Commercial Code,0 we need not dwell on these disagreements because the doctrine, 
no matter how broadly interpreted, has no application here. 
 The Uniform Commercial Code provision on good faith, codified as 13 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 1203 (1984), provides that "[e]very contract or duty within this title 
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."  Good faith is 
defined as "[h]onesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."  Id. 1201.  "With 
rare exception, the courts use the U.C.C. good faith requirements in aid and furtherance 
of the parties' agreement, not to override the parties' agreement for reasons of fairness, 
policy, or morality."  Steven J. Burton, Symposium:  The Revision of Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code:  Good Faith in Articles 1 and 2 of the U.C.C.:  The Practice 
View, 35 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 1533, 1534 (1994).  Thus, courts generally utilize the good 
faith duty as an interpretive tool to determine "the parties' justifiable expectations," 
and do not enforce an independent duty divorced from the specific clauses of the contract.  
Id. at 1542.  For example, a court may use the duty to impose a standard of conduct in a 
requirements or output contract, to ensure that the parties' actions conform to their 
reasonable expectations.  See Denise R. Boklach, Comment: Commercial Transactions:  
Section 1-201(19) Good Faith --Is Now the Time to Abandon the Pure Heart/Empty Head Test?
45 Okla. L. Rev. 647, 667 (1992) (citing cases). 
 The cases on which Duquesne relies all applied the good faith duty in this 
manner to delineate the parties' reasonable expectations.  In Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac 
Roofing Sys., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated in part on other grounds
No. 94-2004 (3d Cir. Aug. 24, 1995), for example, the parties entered into a semi-
exclusive agreement for distribution of the defendant's products in the Philadelphia area.  
Evidence showed that the defendant sold its goods "to distributors that, while situated 
                     
0We agree with the parties' assumption that the Uniform Commercial Code applies.  
Nonetheless, Pennsylvania courts applying the U.C.C. definition of good faith generally 
use common law contract principles.  See Somers v. Somers, 613 A.2d 1211, 1214 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1992) (equating Restatement and U.C.C. duties of good faith.). 
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just outside of Philadelphia, sold their goods into Philadelphia."  Id. at 1367.  Thus, 
there was a legitimate question regarding "the parties' reasonable expectations" of how 
the semi-exclusive distributorship arrangement would work.  Id. In Doe v. Kohn Nast & 
Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994), the court found that "[b]arring an attorney 
from access to two of the crucial tools of his trade . . . is readily construable as an 
interference with, or at the very least a failure to cooperate in, the performance of his 
contractual obligations."  Id. at 1325.  Certainly, one would not expect a party wit
one has a contract to interfere with its ability to carry out its end of the bargain.  
 In the absence of a dispute about the parties' reasonable expectations under a 
particular term of the contract, an independent "duty of good faith has been recognized 
[only] in limited situations."  Creeger Brick and Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Mid-State Bank and 
Trust Co., 560 A.2d 151, 153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Sensenig v. Spring Glen Farm Kitchen, 
Inc., 1992 WL 540682 at * 2 (Pa. Cm. Pl. Aug. 4, 1992).   After all, "[i]f contracting 
parties cannot profitably use their contractual powers without fear that a jury will 
second-guess them under a vague standard of good faith, the law will impair the 
predictability that an orderly commerce requires."  Burton, 35 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. at 
1550.  Thus, an independent contractual duty to act in good faith "has been imposed upon 
franchisors in their dealings with franchisees . . upon the relationship between insurer 
and insured . . . [and] in connection with an employer's attempt to recoup theft losses 
from the wife of an employee who was responsible for the thefts."  Creeger, 560 A.2d at 
153-54 (citing cases); see also Loos & Dilworth v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 500 A.2d 
1155, 1160 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) ("[A] franchisor must act both in good faith and in a 
commercially reasonable manner when terminating a franchise."). 
 "The obligation to act in good faith . . . varies somewhat with the context."  
Somers v. Somers, 613 A.2d 1211, 1213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).  Here, Duquesne attempts to 
read into the contract a provision which it neither bargained for nor attained -- a 
guarantee of 40 years.  Furthermore, by its own admission Duquesne with this count is 
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simply dressing up its fraud claim to avoid the "clear and convincing" evidentiary hurdle.  
See Br. at 27 ("This claim was particularly important because it could be proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence, as opposed to the 'clear and convincing' standard applied 
to the fraud claim.").  In this context -- where two sophisticated business entities have 
engaged in an arms-length transaction --we do not believe that Pennsylvania courts would 
impose an independent duty of good faith not tied to a contractual term.0 
  
C. The Summary Judgment 
 Finally, Duquesne challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Westinghouse on its negligent misrepresentation claim.  The district court 
adopted the magistrate's judge's reasoning and conclusion that the economic loss doctrine, 
which prohibits plaintiffs from recovering in tort economic losses to which their 
entitlement flows only from a contract, barred this count.  We exercise plenary review 
over the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim. 
 Although the economic loss doctrine can be traced to the 1965 decision in 
v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965), application of the doctrine gained momentum 
when the Supreme Court adopted it in the context of admiralty products liability law.  In 
that posture, the Court held that "a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty 
under either a negligence or strict products-liability theory to prevent a product from 
injuring itself."  East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 106 
S.Ct. 2295 (1986).  In reaching its decision, the Court, noting that "if [products 
liability remedies] were to progress too far, contract law would drown in a sea of tort," 
id. at 866, 106 S.Ct. at 2300, reasoned that "[w]hen a product injures only itself the 
reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak and those for leaving the party to its 
contractual remedies are strong."  Id. at 871, 106 S.Ct. at 2300.  We since have 
                     
0We reject Duquesne's tenuous attempts to tie the duty of good faith to particular 
provisions of the contract. 
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interpreted East River to mean that "it is the character of the plaintiff's loss that 
determines the nature of the available remedies."  King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047, 
1051 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying Pennsylvania law).  In other words, "[w]hen loss of the 
benefit of a bargain is the plaintiff's sole loss, . . . the undesirable consequences of 
affording a tort remedy in addition to a contract-based recovery [are] sufficient to 
outweigh the limited interest of the plaintiff in having relief beyond that provided by 
warranty claims."  Id. 
 Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court neither has rejected nor adopted the 
doctrine, the state's intermediate appellate courts and federal courts applying 
Pennsylvania law routinely have applied the East River principles.  In REM Coal Co. v. 
Clark Equip. Co., 563 A.2d 128 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (en banc), the Superior Court held 
that "recovery in tort is barred in product liability actions between commercial 
enterprises where the only damage alleged is to the product itself."  Id. at 132. As the 
court explained, "contract theories such as breach of warranty are specifically aimed at 
and perfectly suited to providing complete redress in cases involving . . . economic 
losses."  Id. at 129.  Following the analysis of East River, the court pointed out that 
"such losses are based upon and flow from the purchaser's loss of the benefit of his 
bargain and his disappointed expectations as to the product he purchased.  Thus, the harm 
sought to be redressed is precisely that which a warranty action does redress."  Id.
New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 564 A.2d 919, 925 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1989) (en banc), the court went still further, stating that "even in the 
absence of the parties' agreements, we would nevertheless hold that [the plaintiff's] 
recovery for damages pleaded in the negligence and strict liability counts is barred as a 
matter of law because the losses alleged are purely economic in nature and cannot be 
recovered in negligence or strict liability."  Id. at 925; see also Grode v. Mutual Fire, 
Marine, and Inland Ins. Co., 623 A.2d 933, 934 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).   
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 In King we predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply the 
economic loss doctrine to preclude tort recovery against a manufacturer of a component of 
a product. King, 855 F.2d at 1051.  And important in this context, in Lower Lake Dock Co. 
v. Messinger Bearing Corp., 577 A.2d 631 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), the plaintiffs attempted 
to limit application of the economic loss doctrine to products liability cases, but the 
court quickly rejected the invitation.  Rather, it indicated "appellants' distinction is 
without meaning.  Our decision in REM Coal is not limited to products liability, but has 
equal application in negligence cases."  Id. at 635. 
 Duquesne, however, argues that neither the economic loss doctrine specifically 
nor East River generally have any application here because Pennsylvania also has adopted 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552, which, Duquesne contends, governs all claims of 
negligent misrepresentation.  Section 552 provides as follows: 
Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others 
 
(1)  One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, 
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, 
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their 
business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss 
caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if 
he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or 
communicating the information. 
 
In Rempel v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 370 A.2d 366, 367 (Pa. 1977), the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania noted that "the elements of the tort of negligent misrepresentations are 
stated in Section 552 of Restatement of Torts."  See also Moffatt Enter., Inc. v. Borden 
Inc., 807 F.2d 1169, 1174 (3d Cir. 1986).  Duquesne, however, draws too many inferences 
from that statement. 
 First, Duquesne's argument relies on the inaccurate premise that section 552 
conflicts with a broad interpretation of the economic loss doctrine.  In Rempel the court 
did not engage in an analysis of the scope of section 552.  See Rempel, 370 A.2d at 371.  
Rather, after the court cited the section, it simply analyzed the case in standard 
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contract terms, albeit continuing to state that "this action is one in trespass for 
negligent misrepresentations rather than in assumpsit for breach of contract."  Id.
370.  For example, in discounting the defendant's assertion that the contract terms 
trumped any representations that were made during pre-contract negotiations, the court 
relied not on section 552 but on the "adhesion" nature of insurance contracts.  Thus, 
"[c]onsumers . . . view an insurance agent . . . as one possessing expertise in a 
complicated subject.  It is therefore not unreasonable for consumers to rely on the 
representations of the expert rather than on the contents of the insurance policy itself."  
Id. at 368.  Indeed, "[t]he idea that people . . . are under no duty to read a written 
insurance policy is not novel."  Id. at 369.  And, importantly, the court pointed out that 
"[t]he application form, which is the offer being made by the consumer, could be prepared 
in large type in terms easily understood by the insured so that reliance on the agent's 
representations would not be necessary." Id. at 370.  In other words, only because 
insurance contracts are written in arcane language that the ordinary consumer cannot 
understand, which in turn forces the consumer to rely on the agent's representations, is 
the consumer not bound by the contract language. 
 Further still, in holding the parol evidence rule inapplicable, the court again 
relied on contract rather than tort law.  Specifically, the court discussed the contract 
principle that "the parol evidence rule is no bar to oral testimony designed to show that 
the writing is not an integrated writing."  Id. at 371.  In fact, the court noted that 
"[w]hether or not the parol evidence rule should be inapplicable in all misrepresentation 
cases is an issue we need not now decide."  Id. at 370.  Thus, notwithstanding the court's 
citation to section 552, its analysis relied almost exclusively on doctrines arising out 
of contract law.  And to the extent that it relied on section 522, it was only because 
strict application of common law contract principles would have worked an injustice in the 
case in which the parties clearly had unequal bargaining power. 
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  The implication, of course, is that if the parties to the contract were 
sophisticated business entities engaging in an arms-length transaction, ordinary contract 
principles would govern their relationship.  Properly read, then, Rempel supports 
Westinghouse's, rather than Duquesne's, position. 
 Second, a close reading of section 552 itself reveals that the Restatement is 
concerned with liability in cases where contract remedies are unavailable.  The section's 
imposition of liability on those who "suppl[y] false information for the guidance of 
others in their business transactions," does not lend itself very easily to a contract 
situation.  Indeed, virtually all the examples provided in the section involve liability 
to third parties.  The reason is simple:  where there is privity in contract between two 
parties, and where the policies behind tort law are not implicated, there is no need for 
an additional tort of negligent misrepresentation.  Breach of contract, promissory 
estoppel, unjust enrichment, and other contract or quasi-contract remedies all protect 
parties who negotiate and reduce their agreement to writing. 
 The economic loss doctrine, then, is not at odds with section 552, but only 
covers situations in which "a party in privity of contract with another suffers an injury 
to a product itself, resulting in purely economic loss."  Grode v. Mut. Fire, Marine, and 
Inland Ins. Co., 623 A.2d at 934.  There is no reason in principle to carve out an 
exception to this rule when the negligence consists of misrepresentation and Duquesne 
points to no reported opinion doing so.  Indeed, courts in jurisdictions which have 
adopted the economic loss doctrine routinely have declined to carve out an exception for 
claims of negligent misrepresentation.  See Eagle Traffic Control v. Addco, 882 F. Supp. 
417, 419 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (applying Pennsylvania law) (economic loss doctrine applies to 
claims of negligent misrepresentation); Apollo Group, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 58 F.3d 477, 
480 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying Arizona law) ("negligent misrepresentation is not an 
exception to the 'economic loss' rule."); Bailey Farms, Inc. v. Nor-Am Chem. Co., 27 F.3d 
188, 191 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying Michigan law) (same).  The economic loss doctrine is 
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designed to "maintain[] the separate spheres of the law of contract and tort."  New York 
State Elect. & Gas. Corp., 564 A.2d at 925.  A party who engages in contractual 
negotiations with another has the ability to protect itself in the contractual language 
against the other party's innocent, though wrong representations. 
 We therefore predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply the 
economic loss doctrine in this case, and we affirm the district court's grant of summary 
judgment. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 For all the reasons detailed above, we will affirm the orders and judgments of 
the district court in their entirety.0 
               
 
      
                     
0Duquesne also contends that the district court erred in granting Westinghouse's Rule 
50(a) motion on its RICO claim.  We have considered Duquesne's argument and find it to be 
without merit.   
